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In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

Plaintiff-Appel I ant, )
)
)
)

-vsHARRISON LARGO,
HARRY TSOSIE,
CHAVEZ WHITEHORSE,
RE ID BARBER,
MOSE CLARK, and
CLARENCE PETER,

)

Case No.
11832

)
)
)

)
)
Defendants-Respondents. )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondents seek the affirmance of the
Court's order granting said respondents' motion
for Arrest of Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The respondents concur in the allegations of
the State, concerning the disposition in the lower
court wherein respondents Chavez Whitehorse, Reid
Barber, Mose Clark, Clarence Peter, and Harry
Tsosie were convicted of the crime of assault with
intent to commit rape, and respondent Harrison
Largo was convicted of simple assault. Respondents
further agree that after the return of the aforernent i oned verdicts by the jury, the Court granted
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respondents' motion for Arrest of Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts
as I isted in the brief of the appellant , insofar
as they go. However, it is the contention of
respondents that in addition to the facts as
stated in said brief of appellant certain other
factual information is required to place in proper
perspective the occurrences.
The facts indicate that on April 7, 1969
there was a power failure at the lntermountain
Indian School located at Brigham City, Utah. This
power failure resulted in the campus being plunged
into darkness and cons i derab I e amount of vanda I is:.
occurred, as wel 1 as the attack on a number of
female students, including the rape of two of said
students (T.231-233).
The Indian School then conducted its own
investigation for some time, and indicated to
certain tribal leaders that they intended to call
in the Brigham City Pol ice Department for assistance, as indicated in the testimony of one of the
supervisors of the Indian School:
I met with them and informed them
of our procedure that we were fol lowing,
how we were involving Mr. Sneddon
(Brigham City police officer), and the
sessions, the question sessions with the
students and how we were going to proceed."
On Apri I 8, 9, JO, 11, and 12, the investiga·
tion and questioning took place (T. 194).
The questioning of these students was conducted both by Indian School staff as well as by
Officer Sneddon. The time period during which the
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students were questioned ra11ged from after noon
until as late as 5:00 A.M. (T.217). In one
instance a defendant, Reid Barber, was brought
from his bed at 11:00 P.M. on the ninth day of
April, 1969, was not questioned but returned to
his bed after a wait of approximately one hour.
He was then returned to the off ice where
Mr. Sneddon was conducting the questioning on the
tenth day of April, 1969, and remained there for
approximately one hour and was again returned to
his dormitory. The third time he was brought for
questioning was at approximately 1:00 A.M. and he
remained approximately one hour before being questioned (T.326).
The transcript is replete with instances
wherein the school authorities indicated they took
an active part in the interrogation of specific
students (T.185, T.328, T.215, T.314, T.316, T.319,
T.323, T.328, T.338, T.444).
In several instances the school authorities
indicated during the testimony that they considered
their position to be one in which they had investigative responsibilities and duties. This included
statements (T.375) that the employees considered
they were representing 11 both sides. 11 In addition
(T.444), there is testimony that a Mr. Smith interrogated Harry Tsosie as follows:
was there when I was about -- and
then he took me out, and this was
about 2:30 A.M.
11 Q.

Two-thirty in the morning?

11A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And who had you ta 1ked to between
10:00 o 1 clock and 2:30 in the morning?

4
Just Mr. Smith.
11

Q.

And what question did Mr. Smith
ask you?
He told me that I was involved with
the breaking into the girls' building
and he told me to tel I what I was
doing over there. He had a tape
recorder that I talked into.

11

Q.

And did he have a tape recorder al 1
the time?
Yes.
out.

11

He turned it off when he went

We concur with the statement of appellant
at no time did the employees of the lntermountain
Indian School advise the defendants of their rights
under the rule embodied in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). We further agree that a reading
of a so-called 11Miranda card 11 was given by police
Officer Sneddon. We contend, however, that the
employees of the lntermountain Indian School who
were present with the boys during the interrogatioo
by the Brigham City pol ice officer were not there
to protect the rights of these defendants, but were
there to assist 0 ff i cer Sneddon and were a pa rt of
the investigatory team.
It is not contended at any
place, either in the transcript or in the brief oi
appellant, that the defendants were informed that
they need not be interrogated.
In most instances
they were brought from their beds late at night,
or early in the morning, and were not given a
choice whether or not they would be summoned. They
were awakened by Indian School personnel and taken
to an office for questioning by Officer Sneddon

(T.196).

It is the contention of the appellant that

5

a meaningful and knowledgeable waiver of the
rights of the defendants under the Miranda rule
was had. However, the transcript is replete with
numerous instances wherein no attempt was made to
indicate to these students the penalty for rape.
(T.197, T.215, T.223).
In connection with the right to counsel, it
was never explained in an adequate manner how
these Indian boys, most of whom were hundreds of
miles from home, would be able to secure services
of an attorney. The mere bald statement that
counsel would be provided, we submit, is unsufficient. An illustration of this problem can be
found (T.352) wherein the fol lowing testimony was
given by Ron Edwards, an employee of the school:
And yet you didn 1 t apprise him of
any consequence that might occur as
a result of making this statement?
I did not tell him anything about it.
All I asked him was to tell the truth.
That was my advice to him.
And that's all the advice you gave him?
"A.

Yes.

"Q.

Yet you were his guidance counselor?

"A.

Right.

"Q.

Did you know of what constitutional
rights he had at the time?

"A.

Yes, I know he could have contacted a
1awyer.

"Q.

How could he have contacted one?

''A.

I don't know, but I know he has a
right to.

6
"Q.

How could he have contacted one? Did
you tell him that he could get up and
walk out of that room and contact a
lawyer?

''A.

No.

11

At the beginning of the trial a hearing was
made upon defense counse 1 1 s motion to suppress
statements of the defendants (T. 160).
The Court,
after listening to the motion and testimony in
re I at ion ship thereto, met in chambers with counsel
and announced thereafter that the trial would coomence (T.229).
After the trial was concluded and
the verdicts rendered, the Court, having not heretofore forma 11 y made an announcement in the record
concerning the motion to suppress, made the
ing statement:
"In this Court's view now -- and I confess
that if I had it to do over again I
wouldn't have even sent for the jury
in
this Court's view, the statements obtained
by the officer were so tainted and so
muddied up that they can't or couldn't be
said to be free and voluntary.
"Now I realize that what I am saying now is
different from what I instructed this jury
this morning.
If this were nine o'clock
A.M., feeling as I do now, I would have
had to have told this jury that these
written confessions which were received in
evidence could not be deened voluntary.
because two prior oral statements previous
no warnings had been given."
(T.516)
The Court, in further explanation of his order
granting the motion for Arrest of Judgment (T.511
stated as fol lows:
"The defendants have no money, Tribal
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t:ouncil gave these boys no assistance, the
Department of the Interior gave these boys
no assistance, they're paupers here before
the court, and the court does not propose
to 'throw the book' at these boys and force
the defendants to appea 1 in order to
clarify this question. 11
"But as of right now, as long as this individual is sitting in this court in this
District, no officer, no guidance authority
must ever take any confess ions from anyone
without giving them the Miranda warning.
As long as I sit here, I will not receive
any confessions by any school officer, any
peace officer if such be based on a secret,
private confession theretofore obtained,
without giving the Miranda warning.n (T.517)
ARGUMENT
PO I NT
THE STATE IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO PROSECUTE AN
APPEAL IN THIS CASE.

The respondents concede that the State may
the judgment in this case.
PO I NT 11
THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO THE MIRANDA
WARNING WHEN BEING QUESTIONED CONCERNING THE
ALLEGED CRIME BY THE INTERMOUNTAIN INDIAN SCHOOL
PERSONNEL, PRIOR TO THEIR BEING QUESTIONED BY
OFFICER SNEDDON.
(A)

THE RESPONDENTS WERE IN A STATUS OF 11 CUSTOD IAL
I NTERROGATI ON 11 BY THEIR GU I DANCE COUNSELOR.
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(B)

THE GUIDANCE COUNSELORS WERE NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, BUT WERE IN THE STATUS OF
AIDING THE OFFICER IN HIS INVESTIGATION.

We agree with the appellant that the rule
governing this issue is as stated in the brief of
the appellant:
• • • The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant • . . By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has--been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. 11 (Emphasis added.)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
11

(A)

THE RESPONDENTS WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR FREEDOM
OF ACTION IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY UNDER THE TERMS
OF THE MIRANDA CASE.

The brief of the appellant while quoting the
rule in the Miranda case, as set forth above,
correctly, speaks only of the question of 11 custody 11 •
It does not discuss the 11 or 11 aspect of the rule.
The real issue under this argument concerns itself
with the question of whether or not these students 1
freedom of action had been impaired in any significant way.
In approaching this argument it is
necessary to point out the fact that these
were several hundred miles from home. Were 1 iving
in a "boarding school" environment. The school, in
addition to providing these students with educational opportunities, further provided them with
counselors of various types. This guidance service
is provided on a twenty-four-hour basis for these
students (T. 176). These guidance people provided

e
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the students with personal assistance as wel I as
assistance in connection with their formal education.
The school, however, as indicated in the
statement of facts I isted heretofore, determined
to take an active part in the investigation of
these alleged crimes.
This involved investigation
v:ork by school personnel, interrogation of
individual students, taking of tape-recorded
statements of students, and advice to students as
ro the manner in which they shou Id conduct themselves while being interrogated by pol ice Officer
Sneddon.
Under these circumstances, it is the
contention of the respondents that the Court
correctly viewed the total situation in ruling
that the students were given no assistance by
either the government, the school, or their tribe,
in hand I ing a situation which could result in
their imprisonment for life (T.517).
In questioning these students at all hours of the day and
night, including as late as 2:45 A.M. (T.444) in
taking them from their beds to answer questions,
in one instance for three successive nights
(T.325), and in no instance indicating to the
students that they did not have to go to be interrogated by pol ice Office Sneddon (T.196), the
school was acting as part of the pol ice process.
Under the factual situation as reflected in
the transcript, it is clear the students were
deprived of their freedom of action in a significant way.
It is further clear that the reason for
the deprivation of their freedom of action was to
assist the pol ice officer in his gathering of
evidence against these defendants.
In regard to the question of whether or not
the investigation had 11 focused on the accused,"
as required in the case of Escobedo v. I 11 i no is,
378 U.S. 478 (1964), a brief resume of the manner
in which the school and the Pol ice Department
cooperated during this investigation will clearly
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indicate that these students who were questioned,
both by Mr. Sneddon and by the individual Indian
School personnel, were in the category of those
defendants upon whom the investigatory 1 ight was
in fact focused.
The heretofore quoted statement of Mr. Stan1ay Speaks, a Senior Supervisor at the Indian School
(T. 195) wherein he indicated to the Tri ba 1 Leaders
that 11we were involving Mr. Sneddon, 11 indicates the
active part the School was playing in the investigation. A Guidance Counselor informed Mose Clark
(T.314), after an initial discussion with him, to
return and discuss the matter with him again. De·
fendant Reid Barber (T.319) was questioned by a
Mr. Palmer, a school official, and the fol lowing
testimony was elicited:
11

A.

talked to Reid twice down at the
Guidance Center, both times his name
had come up again and again as being
involved in some way in this, and so
we asked him to come down. These two
times that I talked with Reid, I just
talked to him casually and asked him
if he knew anything about what had
happened down there that he wanted to
tell me. Both times he said he didn't
and he went back to the dormitory. 11

It can hardly be contended by the appellant
that this type of interrogation, without benefit of)
any warning whatsoever, was not of a suspect on
whom the investigation had focused. Later, after
two appearances before the Student Gui dance Personne l, Mr. Barber was taken before the pol ice officer
and a statement secured.

I

The brief of the appe 11 ant speaks of the fact
that Officer Sneddon questioned students whose
names had been supplied him, in the area of
11 general
questioning. 11 In every instance the stu·
dents questioned by Mr. Sneddon were those who
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the Indian School personnel had previously deter, jned were suspects upon which 11 the investigation
should be focused. 11
The brief of appellant
further speaks
of 11 requests 11 by which the students were brought
before Officer Sneddon. In no instance does the
transcript reflect that any student was 11 requested 11
to go before Officer Sneddon. In each instance
the student was approached by Indian School personnel and told to come to the area, to the off ice of
Mr. Sneddon for questioning.
It is true that the
respondents went to Officer Sneddon in the company
of their counse I or. However, as has been i 11 ustrated throughout the transcript, the counselors
gave them no advice other than to tell the truth,
and had themse Ives, in most instances, been active
in the investigation and interrogation of the
students whose welfare they were alleged to be
protecting. The brief of the appellant indicates
that their presence at the interrogation by
Officer Sneddon could not be considered as
11
constructive custody. 11 It must be left to conjecture whether the students would have gotten
out of bed and accompanied their Guidance Counselors to these late hour interrogation sessions
if given a choice. The evidence is silent that
any of them were told they need not accompany
their counselor to these question sessions. Under
these circumstances, in view of the pecu 1 i ar hand i caps under which these students were found, the
facts negate any serious contention that a voluntary
refusal on their part to accompany their counselors
was tenable. The clear imp I ication was that they
v1ere being ordered by schoo I personne I, to whom
they owed a duty to obey, to accompany said personnel for questioning.
It is clearly a "deprivation"
of their freedom of action in a significant way
under the Miranda ru I e.
The next contention of the appel !ant, that the
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purpose of the Guidance Counselors being present
was to represent the best interests of the studenti
is negated by the testimony of the counse I ors that
they were active in the investigation. As has beer
pointed out (T.375) the Guidance Counselors consid·
ered their position to be of a dual nature. This
is indicated by the statement that they were on
11
both sides." The brief of appe 11 ant speaks
finally of the case of United States v. Manglona,
414 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1969).
In the Manglona we
have a situation where an adult volunteered to be
questioned. The case further indicates that the
defendant, Manglona, was specifically told that he
was not under arrest and was free to terminate the
interview at any time. We believe the court
correctly ruled in the Manglona case that he was
not in custody.
In no instance in the present
case, however, is there any indication that these
students were told, either directly or indirectly,
either by word or deed, that they were free to
terminate the interview at any time; either the
interview with Officer Sneddon or the interviews
with their Guidance Counselors, wherein the
incriminating evidence was first secured.

In conclusion, it is the contention of the
respondents that there was in fact cus tod i a 1 inter·
rogation in this case.
In the event, however, it
is determined there was not custodial interrogation
there surely was a situation in which they were
deprived of "their freedom of action in a signifi·
cant way." I call attention to the specific manner
in which the Court states, in the Miranda case,
that the deprivation is in "any" significant way.
The contention that the students were sti I I on
their campus, that they were not taken away from
their usual area of living, is not a correct view.
They were taken, frequently late at night, to an
office building and there required to wait for .
various periods of time until taken before a police
officer.
It is hard to conceive of a situation
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more conducive to frightening and removing the
nature of an Indian student's state,,1ents, than to subject him to being removed from
his bed and questioned under the circumstances
of this case.
Therefore, we contend there was custodial
interrogation.
There was significant deprivation
of their freedom of action.
(8)

THE GUIDANCE COUNSELORS, WHILE NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, WERE ACTING IN AN INVESTIGATORY
CAPAC I TY.

We concede that the school Guidance Counselors
are not pol ice officers.
We cannot concede, as
alleged by the appellant, that their function was
to assist the student with his problems and counsel
him in matters leading to an education and a useful
life (P.11).
While they may be in this capacity in
the usual course of their duties at the school, in
this instance they were recruited to assist a
The
• police officer in an investigation of a crime.
quotations heretofore I isted in this brief show the
school took an active part in the investigation.
The school held meetings and collected names and
statements.
They interrogated individual students,
took statements, tape-recorded statements, and
actively advised the students concerning how they
should conduct themselves while before the Brigham
City pol ice officer.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
the court indicated that if the questioning was
"initiated 11 by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way, the prohibition would apply to the agents of
the officers as we I I as the officers themse Ives.
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In a 11 of the cases cited by the appe 1 l ant o;
this point, People v. Ronald W. (Anonymous), 24 N.
Y.2d 732, 249 N.E.2d 882 (1969), and as in Clark
v. State, 222 S.2d 766 (Fla. 1969), the
n
that probation officers are simi Jar to these
VJ
Counselors is fallacious. The primary
A
difference between the two situations is that in
the case of the probation officer, questions were
directed to their probationers concerning needle
marks and other evidence that might reflect on a ,
probation violation. The probationers made
sions or confessions to their probation officers
which indicated they were implicated in crimes.
In these instances the questioning was ruled
a normal part of a probation officer's services to
his probationer. However, in the instant case we
have a situation where the school actively
initiated an investigation as to this specific
alleged act, the alleged rapes, and were actively
seeking information and suspects. When suspects
were located they were questioned by school
personnel, and if the answers indicated impl ication, were taken before Officer Sneddon.
It is significant that on a number of instance'
the transcript reflects that the students were
questioned a number of times, indicating the invest
gation had been focused upon them. This occurred
when a student's name was mentioned more than once
others who were being questioned (T. 185). The
respondents do not believe it can seriously be
contended that the school personnel, from the
beginning of this occurrence until the statements
were taken by pol ice Officer Sneddon, were anything
other than investigators assisting the pol ice
officer, and that under the terms of the Miranda
case their work was in fact "initiated'' by a law
enforcement officer. Therefore, their acts are
the acts of the pol ice officer and come within the
purview of and the prohibition of the Miranda case.
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O;

N.

or

THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT PROPERLY ADVISED OF

THEIR MIRANDA RIGHTS BY OFFICER SNEDDON.
ANY
WAIVER THEREOF WAS NOT MADE VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY,

AND INTELLIGENTLY.

1·

ice!

st

e

ng

e.

We concede that the record indicates a Miranda
wMning was given by Officer Sneddon in each
instance.
We do not concede that there was an
understanding of the defendants' rights under the
Miranda rule prior to their givinq statements to
Officer Sneddon.
It is the contention of appellant that these statements were not given after
long periods of interrogation.
This we concede,
as well.
In fact, the testimony indicates the
longest interrogation by Officer Sneddon was
thirty-five minutes, and the shortest interrogation was five minutes (T.190).
The fact that
these students were taken, without being asked if
they wished to go. to be interrogated by Officer
Sneddon at late and unusual hours, as has been
cited repeatedly in this brief, is anothP.r
that would tend to indicate that these statements
were not voluntary.
The testi1Pony in the case
indicates little, if anything, was said concerning
the nature of the charges that might be brought or
the penalty therefor (T.197, T.215, T.223).
The evidence

is summarized by the Court

IT.570). wherein he indicated that they had

received no assistance from the United States
Govern111ent, the Tribal Council, or the Indian
School itself.
In addition to the age and
lang1Jage barriers that existed, the fact that
these students were far from home and those who
It is the concould assist them is i1nportant.
tent ion of the respondents that these various
factors, separately as well as together, clearly
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indicate that these students were not in a position to intelligently and knowingly waive a
valuable right, in view of the nature of the
charge and the penalty attached thereto.
POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS AN ISSUE
IN THIS MATTER.

A motion was made by respondents to arrest
judgment, after a return of guilty by the jury.
The Court had, heretofore, heard evidence in connection with the motion to suppress the statements
of the respondents.
The Court did not, at the
conclusion of this hearing, formally state a
decision.
The Court did order the trial to commenc,
however.
The issue appears to be whether or not
the Court, after al lowing the case to go to the
jury and after having received the verdict of
guilty on the charges, can then grant a motion in
Arrest of Judgment, and bar the State from enforce·
ment of the jury's verdict under the theory of
double jeopardy.
The case of State v. Iverson, JO Utah 2d 171,
350 P. 2d 152 ( 1960), was a case in which the verdic
had not been forma 11 y entered.
One of the jurors
had changed his mind and before entry of the verdic
had indicated a refusal to concur in a verdict of
guilty.
Also, in this case, the Court had reservec
ruling on a motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, after
the fa i I u re of the jury to agree, the Court grantee
the motion to dismiss.
State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d 1060
(1955), was a case wherein the Court, in indicatin,
that there could be no further proceedings in the
matter, referred to State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah

b

c
d
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03. 157 P.2d 258, as to when jeopardy cittaches.
n the Thatcher case, after a charge of i nvo I untary 111anslaughter had been brought, and the State 1 s
case had been concluded, the defendant moved for
dismissal and this was granted. The defendant was
discharged and the State appea I ed.
It is the
contention of the respondents that the Court's
granting of the respondents' motion in the instant
case was tantamount to the granting of a motion to
dismiss. We contend that, notwithstanding the
Court 1 s failure to expressly reserve decision on
the initial motion to suppress, it still did in
fact grant the original motion. This intention is
reflected in the statement by the Court (T.516):
1

1 f this was nine o'clock a.m., feeling
as I do now, I would have had to have
told this jury that these written confessions which were received in evidence
could not be deemed voluntary, because
two prior oral statements previous no
warnings had been given. 11
11

An overall reading of the transcript clearly
indicates the Court did in fact grant a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the evidence was
insufficient to justify the verdict of the jury.
To require the motion to be labled in a certain
form. or to require the Court to have made a
formal reservation of action, would be to defeat
the ends of justice.
Therefore, the contention of the State that
double jeopardy would not attach in this instance
is without merit. The defendants were tried,
jeopardy attached, and the Court ruled that there
was insufficient evidence to justify a jury in
returning the verdicts of guilty. The Court,
therefore, granted the motion of the respondents
and directed the dismissal of the action.
Both
the State of Utah and the respondents have had
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their day in court, and the judgment of dismissal
should stand.
CONCLUSION

It is the respondents' contention that the
defendants were entitled to the Miranda warnings
prior to being interrogated by their Guidance
Supervisors. It is contended that the focus of
investigation was upon these defendants at the
time the Guidance Counselors questioned them. It
is further the contention of the respondents that
at the time of their questioning they were doing
the work of the pol ice officers, that the questioo
ing was initiated by the pol ice officers and the
school supervisory personnel; that the evidence
reflects a custodial type questioning by the super
visors as wel I as by the pol ice officer; that the
students were deprived in a significant manner of
their freedom under the evidence of this case, ana
were not free to go or not go to sessions of ques·
tioning either with Guidance Counselors or the
pol ice officer. The manner in which the police
interrogation proceeded, preceded by the
gation of the Indian School staff, the late night
questioning, the failure to adequately advise of
penalties, and the failure to effectively communi·
cate with the students their rights to counsel,
would place any statement given by them in the
category of an involuntary statement under the
prohibitions of the Miranda case. Therefore,
appeal of the State should be dismissed and the
respondents permanently discharged.
Respectfully submitted,
L. G. Bl NGHAM
Attorney for respondent
203 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

